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1. Introduction 
 
On July 2, 1997 Thailand floated the Baht and at the same time contributed to the 
replacement of the "Asian Miracle" by the "Asian Crisis". To many observers and investors 
the vulnerability of the Asian countries to abrupt reversals in international capital flows came 
as a surprise. Even after the 1994 Mexican Peso crises and its impact on other emerging 
market countries, also known as the "tequila hangover", most observers continued to believe 
in the sustainability of South-East Asian balance of payments positions mainly because of 
their believe in the strong macroeconomic fundamentals of the countries in the region, such 
as a prudent fiscal policy, low inflation rates and high domestic savings and investments1. 
However, the severity, the spread of the crisis, as well as the speed of this spread and its 
geographical reach are difficult to explain by pointing to “fundamentals”. "Contagion" 
became the catchword for such phenomena and is now widely being used to describe the 
events around the crises of the European Monetary System in 1992/93, the "tequila hangover" 
in 1994, the Asian Crises in 1997, and the impact of the Russian crisis on other emerging 
economies in 1998. 
In a widely accepted, though not undisputed definition in the tradition of 
epidemiological studies, Edwards (2000) asserts that “…contagion reflects a situation where 
the effect of an external shock is larger than what was expected by experts and analysts”. 
This definition implies that contagious effects are to be differentiated from “normal” 
transmissions of shocks across countries, also known as interdependencies. If one follows this 
narrow definition, the task of empirical contagion studies is to investigate whether or not 
                                                           
1 In a 1995 post-Mexico crises analysis on "Emerging Markets and the Liberalisation of Capital Movements" the 
OECD writes: "The key lessons from these and other episodes is that monetary and fiscal policies that support a 
stable and credible economic environment are needed to forestall potentially destabilising capital market 
pressures" (OECD 1995). 
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channels and intensity of shock propagation across countries is changed in certain crises 
periods. Four major strategies have been employed in the literature to identify contagion: 
Correlation of asset prices, conditional probability of currency crises, volatility changes, and 
co-movements of capital flows and rates of return2. Among these four groups, our study is 
related to the analysis of asset price correlation. While most studies investigate changes in 
cross-market interdependencies (e.g. Baig and Goldfajn 1999, Forbes and Rigobon 1999), 
there are only very few studies that explore changes in the existence and the directions of 
causality. Exemptions are recent studies by Edwards (2000) who focuses solely on Chile, 
Baig and Goldfajn (2001) who investigate the contagion from Russia to Brazil, Gelos and 
Sahay (2001) who examine spillovers in transition countries, and Granger, Huang and Yang 
(2000) who investigate stock prices and exchange rates during the Asian crisis. Our study 
extends this literature by providing evidence on the changes in crisis causation by applying a 
Granger-causality approach with respect to sovereign bond spreads as a measurement of 
perceived country risk. We distinguish four different sub-periods and show how causality 
patterns have changed over time and how a first predominantly regional contagion process 
became more global after the Russian default in 1998. In this respect our study sheds also 
more light on the debate whether contagious currency crises more a regional phenomenon as 
suggested by Glick and Rose (1999b) or whether they will eventually spread globally. 
This paper starts in chapter 2 with a short review of the current state of the debate on 
contagion with special emphasis on the existing literature regarding the measurement of 
contagion. Chapter 3 describes the data construction and discusses the methodology used. 
The intra-regional results are discussed in chapter 4, while in chapter 5 the inter-regional 
                                                           
2 For a detailed discussion of the literature see Claessens, Dornbusch and Park (2001), Pesenti and Tille (2000), 
Edwards (2000). 
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results – involving Latin American and Eastern European emerging economies – are 
presented. Chapter 6 concludes. 
 
2. Contagion: Definition, Theories, and Measurement 
 
In a first approximation a contagious currency crisis has been defined as the spread of 
a currency crisis from the ground-zero country (van Rijckeghem and Weder 1999, 2001). 
Generally speaking, currency crises occur when a change in confidence in a currency leads to 
a (sudden) reversal of the capital account. This often manifests itself in drastically reduced 
capital inflows accompanied by massive outflows (capital flight). If the country does not 
resort to capital controls, it will experience a depreciation of its currency or, when defending 
the exchange rate, either a depletion of its foreign exchange reserves or increasing interest 
rates. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999) therefore suggest to define contagion as a 
"sufficiently persistent fallout to raise worries about a possible currency crisis, and involving 
a change in the order of 10% in either reserves, the exchange rate, or the interest rate 
(i.e.1000 basis points)." On the base of this definition they find that all recent crises affect 
both, regional economies, but also, though to a lesser extent, economies that are far away and 
have few economic contacts either with ground-zero country or the other infected regional 
economies. In particular the spread of the Russian crises was more global. 3 
However, there is a point whether any transmission of shocks across countries should 
be viewed as contagion, or whether the use of the term contagion should be restricted to 
situations where “...extent and magnitude to which a shock is transmitted internationally 
exceeds what was considered ex ante” (Edwards 2000). As many observers stress the Asian 
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crisis was in fact largely unanticipated (see for example Chowdhry and Goyal, 2000). In our 
study we therefore follow the narrow contagion definition that builds on Masson (1998), who 
has labeled such unanticipated situations as “pure contagion”. They are to be distinguished 
from “simple contagion” caused by “monsoonal effects” or “linkages”. “Monsoonal effects” 
stand for random aggregate shocks that are hitting a number of countries in a similar way, 
such as increases in international interest rates, a decline in international demand or exchange 
rate changes of major currencies. “Linkages” are normal interdependencies, such as those 
produced by trade and financial linkages between countries. Proponents of the view that the 
Asian currency crisis is propagated by linkages would thus reject its classification as (pure) 
contagion. For example, Glick and Rose (1999a) advocate that trade linkages could explain 
the spread of the crisis across countries. Their approach highlights the role of nominal 
devaluations, which - in the presence of short-run price stickiness - change the relative 
competitiveness of the countries in the region, thus leading to a spread of the crises. Since 
trade also tends to be regionally concentrated, a corollary to this view is that currency crises 
tend to be regionally concentrated. Baig and Goldfajn (1999), however, do not find much 
empirical support evidence for this channel as on the one hand intra-regional trade is 
relatively low and on the other hand the affected Asian countries do not have very similar 
third country export profiles. Other authors highlight financial linkages. Such links can 
typically considered to be present between countries with open financial systems, which can 
act as a transmission channel4. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999) find evidence for a 
“common lender channel” for which "the underlying assumption ... is that bank exposures in 
countries affected by primary financial crises were large, implying substantial potential 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
3 In the cases of the Mexican and Asian crisis this definition results in the same list of countries that Glick and 
Rose (1999a) derive from newspaper reports. The Russian crisis was not investigated by Glick and Rose. 
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losses, and hence the need to restore capital asset ratios, meet margin calls, or readjust risk 
exposure". Likewise country revaluations after learning more about the macroeconomic 
fundamentals or receiving "wake-up calls" may belong in this category. Categorizing such 
theories under the heading linkages, however, presupposes that the financial shocks are 
exogenous, i.e. the transmission process will not change when switching from tranquil to 
crises period.  
Only when the transmission process itself changes when entering crises periods, we 
talk of contagion in the sense of Masson’s pure contagion5. For example, in contrast to 
financial linkages we would talk here about endogenous liquidity shocks. The point can be 
illustrated by a model of asymmetric information among investors proposed by Calvo (1999). 
An endogenous liquidity crisis can be triggered when informed investors sell emerging 
market securities to meet margin calls. If this action is misread by uninformed investors as 
signaling low returns in emerging markets, it can lead to a collapse in other emerging 
markets. Calvo suggests that this mechanism might not happen in tranquil periods and will 
therefore change the propagation mechanism. Secondly, pure contagion can also happen if 
investors change their assessment of the rules under which international finance takes place 
(Claessens, Dornbusch, and Park 2001). Another group of theories of pure contagion are 
those that advocate self-validating losses in confidence that can push economies from a 
"good" into a "bad" equilibrium. The so-called second-generation currency crises models 
belong in this category. While according to Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) "first-
generation" currency crises models explain the run on a currency by inconsistent 
macroeconomic policies, such as the monetization of a huge fiscal deficit in the presence of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
4 Imagine, for example, the case where the bankruptcy of a Korean bank leads to reduced financial flows in form 
of corporate bank loans to Thailand. 
5 Forbes and Rigobon (1999) use the term of “shift contagion” 
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currency peg, "second-generation" models are focusing on a self-fulfilling crisis mechanism. 
In such models currency crises can occur with an arbitrary timing despite sound 
macroeconomic fundamentals, and may lead to multiple equilibria. Obstfeld (1994) first 
constructed such a model for the EMS crises. In contrast to the Obstfeld model the trigger 
mechanism in the Asian crisis episode was, however, clearly not an employment-exchange 
rate stability trade-off. A more recent contribution with an explicit emerging market focus is 
Sbracia and Zaghini (2001) who develop a second-generation currency crisis model where a 
sudden shift in speculator’s behavior can trigger a currency devaluation without any prior 
deterioration of economic fundamentals. Masson (1998) has advocated a balance of payments 
model that is capable of “producing” coordinated investors’ expectation, while other models 
highlight the importance of moral hazard in lending through implicit government guarantees 
that are being withdrawn when losses after the currency attack become visible or model a 
currency crisis as the other side of the coin of a banking crisis where a self-fulfilling loss in 
confidence will force banks to liquidate their investment, thus validating the loss in 
confidence6. Krugman (1999) develops a model that emphasizes transfer problems and the 
balance sheet problem7. In this model, bankruptcies and a banking crisis are the 
consequences of a financial crises and thus self-validating the loss in confidence. In sum, all 
the above-discussed models of (pure) contagion advocate the role of multiple equilibria in 
explaining why channels and intensity of shock propagation across countries is changed in 
certain crises periods.  
We have shown that in a broad sense contagion usually refers to the spread of market 
disturbances from one country to other countries. It has now become obvious that this can be 
                                                           
6 For a detailed discussion see Krugman (1999) and the survey literature referred to in footnote 2. 
7 For an earlier emphasis on balance sheet problem in relation to the 1980s developing country debt crisis see 
Sander (1990). 
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the result of existing normal interdependencies among (emerging) market economies or of 
newly arisen or drastically altered interdependencies. Among the four major strategies have 
been applied in empirical studies to discriminate (pure) contagion from interdependencies 
(correlation of asset prices, conditional probability of currency crises, volatility changes, and 
co-movements of capital flows and rates of return) our study is related to the study of 
correlation of asset prices. In this area, Forbes and Rigobon (1999) have suggested to 
discriminate empirically between the two approaches by testing whether or not cross-market 
correlation increase statistically significantly in crises periods. If yes, crises-contingent 
theories have a point8, if not interdependencies are responsible for the spread of currency 
crises. Simple correlations have, however, been criticized by Forbes and Rigobon (1999). The 
authors argue that simple correlations are biased due to the presence of heteroskedasticity, 
endogeneity, and omitted variables. After correcting for these statistical problems the authors 
test for statistically significant shifts in correlation of stock market returns before and directly 
after the crises for three crises episodes: the 1994 Mexican crises, the 1997 Asian Crises, and 
the 1987 US stock market crash. Their result is striking: After adjusting for the above-
mentioned statistical problems they found only interdependencies, no (pure) contagion. 
However, in the EMS context, Favero and Giavazzi (1999) find evidence for contagion with 
regard to the spreads between German short-term interest rates and the interest rates of some 
of the European countries involved in the crisis. They also control for changes in the 
fundamentals so that the shock (the Danish referendum against EMU) that changes the way 
of transmission is truly causing a specific "disease" called "contagion". Consequently, the 
authors argue in favour of theories that interpret the propagation of shocks as "crises-
contingent", rather than for theories that focus on linkages and leave no special role to crises. 
                                                           
8 The relevance of multiple equilibria would of cause not rule out an important role for linkages. 
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Favero and Giavazzi (1999) thus "...contradict the view that evidence for contagion is only 
the result of the application of poor statistical techniques". In the context of the Asian crisis, 
Baig and Goldfajn (1999) perform cross-market correlations for exchange rates, stock market 
returns, interest rates, and sovereign bond spreads using the Forbes and Rigobon 
methodology. While they find some evidence for an increase in correlation in exchange rate 
co-movements, these result have to be interpreted with reservation since the exchange rates 
were managed or pegged in the tranquil period. The evidence for contagion in stock markets 
is mixed as best, thus - at least not sharply contradicting the Forbes and Rigobon results. For 
interest rates the evidence for contagion is also mixed - not surprising, given that the interest 
rate is also a policy variable. The overwhelming evidence for contagion, however, is found in 
sovereign spreads: "The spreads on dollar-denominated debt, representing default risk, 
display the most striking degree of correlation and evidence for contagion" (Baig and 
Goldfajn 1999). As spreads are directly reflecting the risk perception of financial markets, 
pure contagion may thereby often be "solely the result of the behavior of investors or other 
financial agents" as argued by Claessens, Dornbusch, and Park (2001). In the following we 
will therefore concentrate on an extension of the empirical analysis of sovereign bond 
spreads. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
 
The existing reviewed studies measure changes in cross-market interdependencies but 
fall short of exploring changes in the existence and the directions of causality. Our study will 
provide evidence on the changes in crisis causation by applying a Granger-causality 
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approach. For our study we adopt the narrow definition of contagion as a marked change in 
cross-market interdependencies. Following Baig and Goldfajn (1999) we concentrate on daily 
spreads of US$ denominated sovereign bonds traded in the international markets as the 
relevant measure for contagion. We interpret these spreads as pure measures of country credit 
risk and therefore as indicators of the effects of the crisis as perceived by the international 
financial market.  
More specifically, spreads are defined as the difference between the respective 
sovereign bond yield and the corresponding US Treasury bill yield as reported by 
Datastream. Note that Datastream focuses on maturities when identifying the yield for the 
corresponding US Treasury bill. If a Treasury bill with the same maturity as the sovereign 
bond is not available, Datastream calculates a theoretical yield using linear interpolation of 
yields with longer and shorter maturities. For each country one bond is selected based on the 
following 3-step procedure:  
(1) All US dollar denominated sovereign bonds of the country for which spreads are 
available on Datastream are identified. This resulted in the following number of bonds per 
country9: Argentina 6, Brazil 7, Hungary 1, Indonesia 1, Korea 7, Malaysia 1, Mexico 1, 
Philippines 1, Poland 5, Russia 1, Thailand 2.  
(2) For the countries with multiple bonds outstanding, a choice for one of these bonds has to 
be made. In order to investigate how critical the choice of the bond would be for the final 
results of this study, the spreads of all bonds are first tested for unit roots and then a series 
of cointegration tests is conducted. In general, we found cointegration between all 
                                                           
9 Note that while a country might have issued a larger number of US dollar denominated sovereign bonds, 
Datastream lists spreads only for a smaller sub-sample of bonds and furthermore, does not list ‘dead’ bonds. 
Once bonds mature, their data are deleted from the Datastream database.  
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national bond spreads. Thus, the choice of the bond appears not to be critical to the final 
results of the study. 
(3) For countries, which have only one US dollar denominated sovereign bond outstanding, 
the spread for this bond is obviously used. For countries with multiple bonds, we select 
that bond which has spreads available over the whole time period under investigation. As 
far as possible, we try to select bonds that are most similar across countries with respect 
to maturity. The Datastream codes, which reveal the issuer, issue-date, coupon rate and 
maturity, of the selected bond series are given in Table A1 in the appendix. 
 We investigate four sub-periods: A pre-crisis tranquil period that starts on December 
19, 1996 and ends on July 1, 1997; a crisis period that captures the period from July 2, 1997 
to July 31, 1998; a transition period from August 1, 1998 to July 31, 1999, and a post-crises 
period from August 1, 1999 to March 16, 2000. While the definition of the tranquil and post-
crises periods comes almost naturally, the split between a crisis period and a transition period 
needs more explanation. In particular, in August 1998 two effects occurred: The Russian 
ruble crises and Malaysia's decision to adopt capital controls may both have had differential 
and possibly disturbing effects. The rationale for our decision is therefore to isolate a core 
crises period rather than expecting to learn too much from the transition period. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the daily bond spreads over the different sub-
periods. These spreads reveal that country credit risk rises until the transition period but falls 
as expected during the post-crisis period when the crisis has passed. However, the market’s 
perception of country credit risk does not return to the pre-crisis levels but remains 
consistently higher. This is reflected by the fact that for all countries except Hungary the 
post-crisis spreads are higher than those of the tranquil period. Furthermore, whereas the 
crisis might have spilled over into non-Asian countries, the Asian countries as a group 
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suffered the most deterioration of their country credit risk. Finally, as expected, volatility 
increases during a crisis. The standard deviations of bond spreads increased during the crisis 
and transition period, only to fall in the post-crisis period, with Brazil and Hungary as the 
only exemptions. Spread volatility, however, remained high even in the post-crisis period. 
  
- insert Table 1 here - 
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
The traditional concept for analyzing causation in time series is Granger causality. 
The conventional Granger test specifies a bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) model with a 
lag length set as k: 
 
 tX,it
k
1i
iX,it
k
1i
iX,Xt εYγXβαX +++= −
=
−
=
∑∑  (1) 
 
 tY,it
k
1i
iY,it
k
1i
iY,Yt εXγYβαY +++= −
=
−
=
∑∑  (2) 
 
The Granger causality is examined by testing whether all γi are equal to zero using a standard 
F-test. If we cannot reject the null hypothesis in equation (1) Y is said to Granger-cause X, 
i.e. we reject the hypothesis that Y does not cause X. In an analogous way we proceed with 
equation (2). If causation cannot be rejected in both equations, the variables are 
interdependent. 
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 The above equations are, however, only valid for series that are stationary - that is 
I(0). In earlier causality studies, time-series that were found to be non-stationary - that is I(1) 
- were differenced and thus converted into an I(0) series to which the Granger Causality tests 
could be applied10: 
 
 tX,it
k
1i
iX,it
k
1i
iX,Xt ε∆Yγ∆Xβα∆X +++= −
=
−
=
∑∑  (3) 
 
 tY,it
k
1i
Y,iit
k
1i
Y,iYt ε∆Xγ∆Yβα∆Y +++= −
=
−
=
∑∑  (4) 
 
Later research showed that this procedure is only correct if the two series are not cointegrated 
as MacDonald and Kearney (1987) state: "Granger causality test which are performed on 
time series data should only be filtered by first differencing if the researcher has initially 
demonstrated that the relevant variables are not cointegrated." For cointegrated series, 
different approaches to causality testing have to be applied. Based on results of Sims et al. 
(1990), Demetriades (1996) argues that "test statistics derived from a level VAR framework 
are not valid unless the variables employed are either I(0) or I(1) and cointegrated." This 
implies that equations (1) and (2) could be used to test Granger-causality for cointegrated 
series. On the other hand, Engle and Granger (1987) and Granger (1988) argue that in the 
presence of cointegration, causality tests, which ignore the error correction term (ECT) 
derived from the cointegration relationship are mis-specified and suggest to re-parameterize 
                                                           
10 There is also the possibility that one variable is found to be I(0) and the other I(1). In these cases, the I(1) 
variable will be included in the equation in terms of first differences whereas the I(0) variable will be included 
in levels. As the first differences of an I(1) series will be I(0), this procedure ensures that all series included in 
the equation are I(0). 
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the model in the equivalent error correction model form (ECM). The causality tests in this 
case are based on the following equations: 
 
 tX,1tX,Xit
k
1i
iX,it
k
1i
iX,Xt εECT∆Yγ∆XβαX ∆ ++++= −−
=
−
=
∑∑ ϕ  (5) 
 
 tY,1tY,Yit
k
1i
iY,it
k
1i
iY,Yt εECT∆Xγ∆Yβα∆Y ++++= −−
=
−
=
∑∑ ϕ  (6) 
 
One advantage of ECM-based tests is that they allow us to differentiate between two 
types of causality based on the short-run dynamics of the VAR and on the disequilibrium 
adjustment of the ECM. In particular, the F-test on the estimated coefficients γi provides 
evidence regarding a short-term adjustment dynamics. The t-test of the estimated coefficient 
ϕ provides evidence of the existence of an error correction mechanism that drives the 
variables back to their long-term equilibrium relationship that can is embodied in the 
cointegration vector. Cointegration implies that although the two time-series can wander 
extensively they are still bound together by a stable long-term relationship. For example, if 
cointegration can be found between bond spreads of two countries, this can be interpreted as 
a situation where both countries are affected by and behave similarly to the same shocks in 
the long-run. If now the spread for one country would increase above this equilibrium level 
the ECT would measure the speed at which the spreads return to the equilibrium level. They 
are thus identifying the existence of an effective arbitrage process. Only if markets are non-
cointegrated international diversification is beneficial from the point of view of a portfolio 
investor because of lower levels of correlation across national markets.  
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Taking these considerations into account, we proceed as follows: 
Step 1: We test the time series for unit roots based on equations (7) and (8). A series is 
assumed to be I(1) if the null hypothesis H0: δ1=0 is accepted based on a t-test for the 
level regression (7) but rejected for the first differences regression (8). A series is 
assumed to be I(0) if the t-test indicates rejection of the null for both equations. 
 
 tX,2tX,21tX,1X,0t ε∆XδXδδ∆X +++= −−  (7) 
 
 tX,2t
2
X,21tX,1X,0t
2 εX∆δ∆XδδX∆ +++= −−  (8) 
 
Step 2: We test for cointegration among any pairs of countries by applying standard Durban-
Watson (DW) and Dickey-Fuller (DF) tests to the cointegration regression: 
 
 tX,1X,1X,0t εYηηX ++=  (9) 
 
Step 3: If the series are found to be I(0), causality testing according to equations (1) and (2) 
will be applied. 
 If the series are found to be I(1) and not cointegrated, causality testing according to 
equations (3) and (4) will be applied.  
 If the series are found to be I(1) and cointegrated, causality will be tested based on 
equations (5) and (6). The error correction term using in equation (5) is obtained from 
the estimated error terms of the cointegration regression (9). For equation (6), the 
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estimated errors based on the cointegration regression tY,1Y,1Y,0t εXηηY ++= will be 
used. 
In step 3 we estimate the cointegrating vectors not over the whole period but only for 
the four sub-periods11. Using a cointegration approach over a relatively short period is not 
uncontroversial. However, given the high-frequency data we employ, we believe that this 
approach is justified, in particular as the resulting cointegrating relationships could be 
interpreted as reflecting systematic temporary pattern. However, as our results will show, 
there is very little evidence for cointegration. Only in the crisis and post-crises periods there 
is evidence for cointegration among some countries. This suggests that only in few cases such 
systematic temporary pattern have established themselves during the various Asian crisis 
episodes. Nevertheless, whenever we could not reject the cointegration hypothesis we found 
it necessary to include the ECT in order to avoid the mis-specification of the VAR model. In 
making a choice between estimating the cointegration over a relatively short period of time or 
using a mis-specified Granger-causality analysis that neglects a statistically significant 
cointegration relationship, we opted against the latter alternative. Moreover, a systematic 
temporary pattern in financial markets’ risk assessment may have some validity despite the 
short period. For example, for Indonesia and Korea no cointegration and thus no error 
correction mechanism could be established in all periods except the post-crisis period. This 
could be interpreted as evidence that the market’s risk perception of formerly unlinked 
countries has become related in the post-crisis period. 
                                                           
11 Our approach is related to the methodology applied by Granger, Huang, and Yang (2000) who investigate the 
bivariate causality between stock prices and exchange rates during the Asia crisis. These authors, however, 
estimate a long-term cointegration relationship over a 12-year period, which includes all crises periods allowing 
for the presence of structural breaks. Despite the fact that they did not find evidence in favour of cointegration, 
they always included the ECT and interpret the significance of the estimated coefficient of the ECT as evidence 
for cointegration. While we are in agreement with these authors in not neglecting an existing cointegration 
relationship, we opted for the reasons given above for estimating temporary systemic pattern in order to obtain 
ECTs for such shorter periods. 
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4. Contagion and Causality Inside Asia 
 
 Starting with the unit root analysis of step 1, our tests reveal that in general, all Asian 
series are found to be I(1). The only exceptions are Malaysian spreads in the tranquil period, 
which are found to be I(0). Among the non-Asian series, only the transition period is 
characterized by I(0) series12. Therefore, we have to move to step 2 and investigate the 
presence of cointegration in the relevant cases. Cointegration in spreads appears not to be a 
dominant feature inside Asia in none of the four periods13. Since preliminary experiments 
with our data have shown that the results of cointegration tests are quite sensitive to the 
choice of the period length we adopt a very conservative strategy in accepting evidence for 
cointegration. We interpret the evidence for cointegration as significant only if either one of 
the two test statistics allows the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% 
level or if both statistics allow rejection at at least a 5% level. 
 Using this strict criterion we found that in the tranquil period only the Korea-Thailand 
series are cointegrated and that there exists cointegration between the Philippines and 
Thailand. This implies that individual country risks play the dominant role in determining the 
risk spreads. In the crisis and transition periods evidence for cointegration disappeared almost 
completely (with the exception of Korea-Philippines), but surfaced in the post-crisis period in 
six cases involving all countries. Without wanting to over-interpret these results one might 
conclude that the finding of non-cointegrated markets before the crisis reflects the absence of 
common macroeconomic risk factors. During the crisis and transition period it is at most 
short-term causality that might be identified. In the post-crisis period more evidence for 
cointegration may point in favor of a more uniform perception of regional country risk. 
                                                           
12 Table A2 of the appendix shows the results of the unit root for all countries and sub-periods. 
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However, even that might only constitute only a temporary systematic pattern and may 
disappear in the longer run.14 In other words, (pure) contagion can happen if investors change 
their assessment of the rules under which international finance takes place, as suggested by 
Claessens, Dornbusch, and Park (2001). 
 Going now to our study of causality in step 3, we take the cointegration tests as a base 
for adopting the correct causality test procedure. While having been conservative in 
interpreting cointegration on the one hand we tried to avoid the error of not including the 
ECT on the base of a too strict rejection policy. Therefore, we extend the VAR by the ECT if 
the null of no cointegration could be rejected by at least one test statistic at the 5% level or 
higher.  
 Figure 1 and Table 2 give an overview of the results15. In the tranquil period, there is 
a virtual absence of a causality pattern with the only exception of the two country groups 
where we found cointegration. In the crisis period, we find nine cases of cross-country 
causation. Of these, we could identify the emergence of short-term dynamics of the Granger-
Causality type in eight cases of which two were (statistically significant) supported by 
arbitrage processes as measured by the ECT. In one case causality was based on an arbitrage 
process only (from Thailand to Korea). With the passage of time short-term dynamics start to 
fall from six to three cases while Korea seems to have reestablished its ECT-based causation 
effect on Thailand and - which is new - on Indonesia.  
   
- Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 here –  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
13 The results are presented in Table A3 of the appendix. 
14 Since we do not find much evidence for all but the last sub-period, we are not surprised that Granger, Huang, 
and Yang (2000) could also not find a long-run cointegration relationship between Asian countries. That 
markets as well as the risk-perception are become related might be a particular temporary post-crisis event. 
15 Detailed results are listed in Table A4 of the appendix. 
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 It interesting to note that in the crisis period Thailand was not Granger-causing 
anything, rather some long-term arbitrage processes have appeared only. This result supports 
the view that the stumbling of Korea may have been more important in finally stirring off the 
crisis as "reputational externalities" may have played an important role. According to 
Summers (2000): "A crisis in one country can affect investors' expectations and perceptions 
about common structural conditions and vulnerabilities in other countries and the likely 
policy response to such vulnerabilities." Summers also quotes the 1999 Economic Report of 
the President (Council of Economic Advisors 1999) as stating: "For example investors' 
believe in the strength of the Asian economic model may have changed when one of the star 
performers stumbled."16 
 During the transition period particularly the Granger-causality type short-run 
dynamics continued to be at work probably enforced by the Russian crisis before with the 
stabilizing effects that appeared in 1999 causality gradually disappeared. In line with our 
earlier argument, there was no “temporary systematic pattern” detectable in this period as 
indicated by the complete absence of any evidence in favor of cointegration. In sum, our 
results show that causality patterns that have been absent before the Asian crisis started 
suddenly emerged, thus establishing cross-market linkages that appear to be pure crisis-
contingent. We therefore interpret our results as being supportive of the claim that the crisis 
was to a considerable degree determined by pure contagion rather than interdependencies. 
 
 
                                                           
16 Park and Song (2001) argue that Korea was not directly effect by Thailand but indirectly through Taiwan 
(which is not included in our study for lack of appropriate data). The authors assert that "when foreign banks 
and institutional investors saw that such a stable country as Taiwan with strong fundamentals was vulnerable to 
the crisis in Southeast Asia, they must have concluded that both Hong Kong and Korea would not been immune 
from the crisis." 
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5. Contagion between Asia and Other Emerging Economies  
 
 In a second step we extend our study to investigate the interdependencies of the Asian 
countries with three emerging market in Central and Eastern Europe (Russia, Poland, 
Hungary) and three countries in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico). The results here 
are less clear-cut than in the Asia-restricted sample as Table 3 shows. Cointegration was 
detected in 11 of 60 cases in the tranquil and post-crises periods, in 7 cases during the crisis 
period and was found again to be totally absent in the transition period. As cointegration is 
again not a dominant feature, this allows for differences in individual country risk variations. 
In the post-crisis period there is however a remarkable appearance of cointegration between 
Korea and all other non-Asian sample countries – pointing to a perception of a common risk 
in these emerging market economies. When it comes to causality, it appears that the number 
of statistically relevant short-run causality relationships is increasing in the transition period 
only. This may reflect the impact of the Russian crises, while before the ruble crises the 
Asian crises appeared not to have changed much the causality relationship between Asia and 
the rest of our country sample. It is interesting to note that the Russian crisis appeared not to 
have a direct impact on Asia, but rather invoked new short-run causalities mainly between 
Asian and Latin American countries that had not been present before, possibly pointing to the 
important role of international financial markets in reassessing country risk17. Again, we find 
therefore changing pattern of causality that may support the view of the “pure contagion” 
advocates. It makes, however, also clear that the Asian crisis was first a very regional affair 
that has become a more global one as Russia stumbled and invoked new and more global 
contagion effects. 
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- Insert Table 3 here - 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Our study has extended on conventional measures of contagion defined as a marked 
increase of cross-market correlation by directly investigating changing causality pattern by 
using the Granger-causality methodology. Our results show that the Asian crisis first 
established new and changed causality patterns that were not present before the crises on a 
regional base. Moreover, in some cases it even appeared that in the post-crisis period 
formerly unrelated markets became cointegrated, pointing to a changed perception of 
emerging country risk. Furthermore, it is shown that while the initial impact of the Asian 
crisis appeared to be changing only the regional causality pattern the additional impact of the 
Russian crisis appeared to have changed the causality pattern in an even less predictable way 
crossing continents at random and thus pointing to the important role of international 
financial markets in regional and global financial contagion. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
17 Edwards (2000) discusses the role of the Russian crisis that, in contrast to the Asian crises spread to Latin 
America 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Argentina Brazil Hungary Indonesia Korea Malaysia Mexico Philippines Poland Thailand Russia 
average spread            
full period 3.24 3.63 -0.89 5.70 3.03 1.68 2.56 3.51 0.60 2.65 30.66 
tranquil period 2.82 1.33 0.75 1.12 0.53 0.37 2.12 1.72 0.40 0.51 5.19 
crisis period 2.50 1.98 0.83 4.67 3.23 1.38 1.96 3.18 0.45 3.06 5.67 
transition period 4.00 6.31 -0.09 9.48 4.98 2.98 3.46 4.77 0.93 4.05 65.36 
post-crisis period 3.68 4.17 -6.52 5.37 1.73 1.22 2.53 3.58 0.51 1.53 40.36 
change tranquil-to-post 
crisis 
30% 214% -969% 379% 226% 230% 19% 108% 28% 200% 678% 
median spread            
full period 3.25 2.99 0.65 5.67 2.13 1.27 2.25 3.55 0.52 1.71 12.14 
tranquil period 2.81 1.33 0.68 1.16 0.55 0.38 2.10 1.75 0.39 0.51 5.21 
crisis period 2.50 1.94 0.79 4.72 3.67 0.59 1.95 3.33 0.42 3.76 5.54 
transition period 3.93 6.29 0.37 9.48 4.65 2.97 3.46 4.27 0.86 3.99 69.11 
post-crisis period 3.57 3.97 -6.00 5.26 1.70 1.27 2.38 3.56 0.44 1.65 40.78 
Change tranquil-to-post 
crisis 
27% 198% -982% 353% 209% 234% 13% 103% 13% 224% 683% 
standard deviation of bond spread          
full period 0.79 2.27 3.11 3.56 2.43 1.40 0.76 1.33 0.32 1.94 28.19 
tranquil period 0.33 0.33 0.15 0.21 0.09 0.05 0.22 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.50 
crisis period 0.38 0.91 0.21 2.66 1.83 1.08 0.25 0.76 0.17 1.38 2.01 
transition period 0.53 1.25 1.30 2.58 2.69 1.48 0.48 1.28 0.30 2.19 15.26 
post-crisis period 0.47 1.32 2.68 0.46 0.18 0.42 0.62 0.29 0.27 0.23 9.52 
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Table 2: Intra-Asian Causality 
 Cointegration  Causality 
 tranquil period crisis period transition period post-crisis period 
 
tranquil 
period 
crisis 
period 
transition 
period 
post-crisis 
period short-term ECM short-term ECM short-term ECM short-term ECM 
             
ind Ö kor no no no yes no no no no no no no no 
ind Ö mal no no no no no no yes no yes no no no 
ind Ö phi no no no no no no yes no no no (yes) no 
ind Ö tha (yes) no no (yes) no no yes no yes no no no 
             
kor Ö ind no no no (yes) no no yes no yes no no yes 
kor Ö mal no no no no no no no no no no yes no 
kor Ö phi (yes) yes no no no no (yes) (yes) no no no no 
kor Ö tha yes (yes) no yes (yes) yes no (yes) yes no no yes 
             
mal Ö ind no no no no no no no no no no yes no 
mal Ö kor no no no yes no no no no yes no (yes) no 
mal Ö phi no no no (yes) no no no no no no yes (yes) 
mal Ö tha no no no yes no no yes no no no no no 
             
phi Ö ind no no no no no no no no yes no no no 
phi Ö kor (yes) (yes) no yes no no yes yes (yes) no (yes) no 
phi Ö mal no no no no no no yes no no no (yes) no 
phi Ö tha yes (yes) no (yes) yes no yes yes no no no no 
             
tha Ö ind no no no no no no no no no no no no 
tha Ö kor yes (yes) no yes no no no yes no no no no 
tha Ö mal no no no no no no no no no no no no 
tha Ö phi (yes) (yes) no no no no no no no no no no 
             
number of country-pairs which show:           
cointegration 3 1 0 6         
Granger-causality     2 9 6 5 
ECM-causality only      1 1 0 2 
Note: Regarding cointegration, "x Ö y"  indicates a cointegrating  relationship described as yt = a + b xt. For Granger Causality "x Ö y" should be read as x causing y. Brackets 
indicate marginal evidence for (1) cointegration if only one of the two test statistics are significant at a level of 5%, (2) causality if  significance can be found only at the 10% level. 
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 Table 3: Causality between Asia and other emerging economies 
 Cointegration  Causality 
 tranquil period crisis period transition period post-crisis period 
 
tranquil 
period 
crisis 
period 
transition 
period 
post-crisis 
period short-term ECM short-term ECM short-term ECM short-term ECM 
rus Ö ind no no no no no no no no yes no no no 
ind Ö rus no no no no no no (yes) no no no no no 
hun Ö ind no no no no no no (yes) no no no no no 
indÖ hun no (yes) no no no no no no (yes) no (yes) no 
pol Ö ind no no no no no no no no no no no no 
ind Ö pol yes (yes) no no no yes yes no no no no no 
arg Ö ind no no no (yes) no no no no yes no no yes 
ind Ö arg no no no no no no no no no no no no 
bra Ö ind no no no (yes) no no no no yes no no yes 
ind Ö bra no no no no (yes) no no no no no no no 
mex Ö ind no no no (yes) (yes) no no no yes no no yes 
ind Ö mex no (yes) no no no no no no no no no no 
             
rus Ö kor no no no yes no no yes no no no no no 
kor Ö rus no no no yes no no no no no no no no 
hun Ö kor yes no no yes no yes no no no no no no 
korÖ hun yes no no yes no yes no no no no no no 
pol Ö kor no no no (yes) no no (yes) no yes no yes yes 
kor Ö pol (yes) (yes) no yes no (yes) no no no no no no 
arg Ö kor no no no (yes) no no yes no yes no yes yes 
kor Ö arg no no no yes no no no no yes no no yes 
bra Ö kor no no no yes (yes) no yes no yes no yes yes 
kor Ö bra no (yes) no yes no no no no no no no no 
mex Ö kor no no no yes yes no yes no yes no yes yes 
kor Ö mex no (yes) no yes no no no no yes no no no 
             
rus Ö mal no no no no yes no no no no no (yes) no 
mal Ö rus no no no no yes no no no no no no no 
hun Ö mal no no no no no no no no no no no no 
malÖ hun no (yes) no no no no no yes no no no no 
pol Ö mal no no no no no no no no no no yes no 
mal Ö pol no (yes) no no no no no no no no no no 
arg Ö mal no no no no no no no no no no no no 
mal Ö arg no no no no no no no no yes no no no 
bra Ö mal no no no no no no no no no no no no 
mal Ö bra no no no no no no no no yes no no no 
mex Ö mal no no no no yes no no no no no yes no 
mal Ö mex no no no no no no no no yes no no no 
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Table 3 (conti.) 
 Cointegration  Causality 
 tranquil period crisis period transition period post-crisis period 
 
tranquil 
period 
crisis 
period 
transition 
period 
post-crisis 
period short-term ECM short-term ECM short-term ECM short-term ECM 
             
rus Ö phi (yes) no no no yes no yes no no no no no 
phi Ö rus no no no no no no no no no no no no 
hun Ö phi yes no no no no yes no no no no no no 
phiÖ hun yes no no no no yes no no yes no no no 
pol Ö phi no no no no no no no no yes no no no 
phi Ö pol (yes) yes no no no (yes) no no (yes) no no no 
arg Ö phi no yes no no yes no yes yes yes no no no 
phi Ö arg no yes no no no no no yes yes no no no 
bra Ö phi no yes no no yes no yes no yes no no no 
phi Ö bra no yes no no no no no no yes no (yes) no 
mex Ö phi no yes no no yes no yes no yes no no no 
phi Ö mex no yes no no no no no no yes no no no 
             
rus Ö tha yes no no (yes) yes no yes no no no no yes 
tha Ö rus no no no no no no no no no no no no 
hun Ö tha (yes) no no yes no (yes) no no no no no yes 
thaÖ hun yes no no no no (yes) no no no no yes no 
pol Ö tha yes no no no no no yes no no no yes no 
tha Ö pol yes (yes) no no no yes no no no no no no 
arg Ö tha yes no no no no no yes no no no no no 
tha Ö arg no no no no no no no no no no no no 
bra Ö tha yes no no no no no yes no no no yes no 
tha Ö bra no no no no no no no no no no no no 
mex Ö tha (yes) no no no no no yes no no no yes no 
tha Ö mex no (yes) no no no no no no no no no no 
          
number of country-pairs which show:           
cointegration 11 7 0 11         
Granger-causality     14 15 21 16 
ECM-causality only      6 2 0 6 
See notes to table 2.
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Table A1: Sample Description  
Country Abbreviation Selected Datastream bond series 
Argentina arg ARGENTINA-PAR 1993 G/R 31/03/23 S  
Brazil bra BRAZIL-C BD.(SR-L)FLIRB. 5% 15/04/04-14 STEP-UP  
Hungary hun HUNG.STE.DEV.INST. 1990 10 1/2% 31/08/00  
Indonesia ind INDONESIA 1996 7 3/4% 01/08/06 S  
Korea kor KOREA DEV.BANK 1995 6 1/2% 15/11/02 S  
Malaysia mal MALAYSIA 1990 9 7/8% 27/09/00 S  
Mexico mex MEXICO-PAR (B TO Q) VRR. 6 1/4% 31/12/19 S  
Philippines phi PHILIPPINES 1996 8 3/4% 07/10/16  
Russia rus RUSSIA 1993 3% 14/05/03 
Poland pol POLAND-PAR 1994 3% (2.75) 27/10/24 STEP-UP  
Thailand tha THAILAND P92 8 1/4% 15/03/02  
Note: Naming conventions for bonds on Datastream are such that the issuer, the issue date, the coupon rate and 
the maturity are reported in sequence.  
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Table A2: Unit root tests  
bond series tranquil period  crisis period  transition period  post-crisis period  
 level 1st 
differences 
I(d) level 1st 
differences 
I(d) level 1st 
differences 
I(d) level 1st 
differences 
I(d) 
 t(δ1) t(δ1)  t(δ1) t(δ1)  t(δ1) t(δ1)  t(δ1) t(δ1)  
 
Asian country bonds: 
Indonesia -2.12 -8.33 I(1) -1.41 -13.27 I(1) -1.87 -10.39 I(1) -1.13 -10.50 I(1) 
Korea -2.10 -13.10 I(1) -1.52 -10.58 I(1) -0.59 -13.00 I(1) -2.30 -12.74 I(1) 
Malaysia -6.36* -12.48 I(0) -0.50 -13.63 I(1) -0.99 -11.60 I(1) -2.49 -9.09 I(1) 
Philippines -2.24 -8.70 I(1) -2.39 -16.94 I(1) -1.21 -9.96 I(1) -2.28 -8.96 I(1) 
Thailand -2.74*** -13.54 I(1) -1.79 -12.31 I(1) -1.15 -11.55 I(1) -1.24 -11.57 I(1) 
 
Non-Asian country bonds: 
Russia -1.02 -9.29 I(1) -0.50 -11.19 I(1) -3.35** -11.10 I(0) -0.96 -9.43 I(1) 
Hungary -2.17 -12.62 I(1) -2.31 -11.77 I(1) 2.35* -11.08 I(0) -0.16 -10.53 I(1) 
Poland -2.41 -9.91 I(1) -2.86*** -12.25 I(1) -6.25* -17.22 I(0) -1.47 -12.43 I(1) 
Argentina -1.88 -8.36 I(1) -2.70*** -11.18 I(1) -3.42** -12.05 I(0) -1.45 -11.10 I(1) 
Brazil -2.63*** -8.27 I(1) -1.98 -11.95 I(1) -3.40** -11.89 I(0) -0.95 -9.78 I(1) 
Mexico -1.82 -8.58 I(1) -1.91 -14.37 I(1) -3.14** -11.70 I(0) -0.55 -9.79 I(1) 
Note: The t-test refers to the null hypothesis H0: δ1=0 for the level regression tX,2tX,21tX,1X,0t ε∆XδXδδ∆X +++= −−  and first differences regression 
tX,2t
2
X,21tX,1X,0t
2 εX∆δ∆XδδX∆ +++= −−  . Based on 100 observations, the critical values are -3.46 (1%), -2.88 (5%), and -2.57 (10%). For the 1st differences 
regression, the t-test is always significant. For the level regressions, significance is indicated with *, **, and *** reflecting the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table A3: Cointegration analysis inside Asia 
tranquil period  crisis period  transition period  post-crisis period 
cointegrating vector Durbin 
Watson 
Dickey 
Fuller 
cointegrating vector Durbin 
Watson 
Dickey 
Fuller 
cointegrating vector Durbin 
Watson 
Dickey 
Fuller 
cointegrating vector Durbin 
Watson 
Dickey 
Fuller 
 
ind = 1.06 + 0.12 kor 
  (10.19)  (0.63) 
 
0.112 
 
-2.03 
 
ind = 1.11 + 1.10 kor 
  (5.29)  (19.59) 
 
0.099 
 
-2.55 
 
ind = 6.90 + 0.52 kor 
  (24.24)  (10.29) 
 
0.108 
 
-2.61 
 
ind = 2.70 + 1.55 kor 
  (10.20)  (10.17) 
 
0.326*** 
 
-3.77** 
N.A. N.A. N.A. ind  = 1.95 + 1.97 mal 
  (12.49)  (22.05) 
0.116 -2.92 ind  = 7.45 + 0.68 mal 
  (22.36)  (6.81) 
0.080 -2.24 ind  = 5.18 + 0.16 mal 
  (47.46)  (1.84) 
0.142 -2.50 
ind  = 1.60 - 0.27 phi 
  (7.01)  (-2.08) 
0.158 -2.41 ind  = -2.39 + 2.22 phi 
  (-4.52)  (13.74) 
0.086 -2.38 ind  = 5.68 + 0.80 phi 
  (9.94)  (6.88) 
0.080 -2.17 ind  = 5.89 - 0.14 phi 
  (13.49)  (-1.19) 
0.145 -2.41 
ind = 0.83 + 0.58 tha 
  (7.65)  (2.78) 
0.113 -2.04 ind = -0.23 + 1.60 tha 
  (-1.10)  (25.30) 
0.139 -3.09*** ind = 7.50 + 0.49 tha 
  (24.46)  (7.37) 
0.085 -2.26 ind = 4.25 + 0.73 tha 
  (19.26)  (5.16) 
0.151 -2.60 
 
kor = 0.50 + 0.02 ind 
  (11.68)  (0.62) 
 
0.173 
 
-2.35 
 
kor = 0.78 + 0.52 ind 
  (5.48)  (19.59) 
 
0.095 
 
-2.62 
 
kor = -0.35 + 0.56 ind 
  (-0.65)  (10.29) 
 
0.064 
 
-2.03 
 
kor = 0.38 + 0.25 ind 
  (2.81)  (10.17) 
 
0.386** 
 
-6.34* 
N.A. N.A. N.A. kor = 2.17 + 0.77 mal 
  (13.66)  (8.49) 
0.038 -1.73 kor = 1.11 + 1.30 mal 
  (4.21)  (16.32) 
0.078 -2.28 kor = 1.55 + 0.15 mal 
  (36.94)  (4.53) 
0.214 -5.25* 
kor = -0.41 + 0.54 phi 
  (-6.56)  (15.08) 
0.312 -3.47** kor = -2.89 + 1.92 phi 
  (-10.20)  (22.20) 
0.176 -3.60** kor = -2.44 + 1.564 phi 
  (-5.57)  (17.56) 
0.064 -2.07 kor = 1.70 + 0.01 phi 
  (9.62)  (0.16) 
0.198 -4.79* 
kor = 0.02 + 0.99 tha 
  (1.07)  (23.32) 
1.019* -6.81* kor = -0.23 + 1.130 tha 
  (-1.68)  (27.56) 
0.154 -3.37** kor = 1.70 + 0.81 tha 
  (6.45)  (14.18) 
0.068 -2.09 kor = 0.88 + 0.55 tha 
  (12.88)  (12.55) 
0.316 -6.38* 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
mal = -0.12 + 0.32 ind 
  (-1.55)  (22.05) 
 
0.113 
 
-2.68 
 
mal = 0.86 + 0.22 ind 
  (2.68)  (6.81) 
 
0.045 
 
-1.52 
 
mal = 0.51 + 0.13 ind 
  (1.33)  (1.84) 
 
0.110 
 
-2.46 
N.A. N.A. N.A. mal = 0.52 + 0.27 kor 
  (4.52)  (8.49) 
0.039 -1.22 mal = 1.03 + 0.39 kor 
  (7.59)  (16.32) 
0.088 -2.26 mal = -0.10 + 0.77 kor 
  (-0.34)  (5.43) 
0.122 -2.59 
N.A. N.A. N.A. mal = 0.03 + 0.43 phi 
  (0.10)  (5.29) 
0.034 -1.09 mal = 0.17 + 0.38 phi 
  (3.47)  (5.59) 
0.033 -1.17 mal = -1.36 + 0.72 phi 
  (-3.88)  (7.429) 
0.158 -2.91 
N.A. N.A. N.A. mal = -0.10 + 0.48 tha 
  (-0.79)  (13.28) 
0.051 -1.51 mal = 1.18 + 0.45 tha 
  (8.13)  (14.19) 
0.074 -2.03 mal = -0.31 + 1.00 tha 
  (-1.72)  (8.54) 
0.148 -2.91 
 
phi = 1.85 - 0.11 ind 
  (30.06)  (-2.08) 
 
0.258 
 
-3.02 
 
phi = 2.34 + 0.18 ind 
  (33.00)  (13.74) 
 
0.131 
 
-3.14*** 
 
phi = 2.92 + 0.19 ind 
  (10.52)  (6.88) 
 
0.039 
 
-1.61 
 
phi = 3.90 - 0.06 ind 
  (14.37)  (-1.19) 
 
0.113 
 
-2.86 
N.A. N.A. N.A. phi = 2.89 + 0.21 mal 
  (41.08)  (5.29) 
0.082 -2.54 phi = 3.92 + 0.28 mal 
  (23.23)  (5.59) 
0.027 -1.39 phi = 3.15 + 0.35 mal 
  (51.33)  (7.42) 
0.157 -3.46** 
phi = 1.12 + 1.15 kor 
  (27.37)  (15.08) 
0.351*** -3.75** phi = 2.11 + 0.33 kor 
  (38.18)  (22.20) 
0.225 -4.13* phi = 3.03 + 0.35 kor 
  (26.82)  (17.56) 
0.068 -2.22 phi = 3.55 + 0.02 kor 
  (16.27)  (0.16) 
0.106 -2.82 
phi = 1.20 + 1.02 tha 
  (21.93)  (9.64) 
0.372*** -3.76** phi = 1.90 + 0.42 tha 
  (26.78)  (19.91) 
0.213 -3.99** phi = 4.16 + 0.15 tha 
  (25.83)  (4.34) 
0.028 -1.32 phi = 2.90 + 0.44 tha 
  (20.24)  (4.77) 
0.107 -2.86 
 
tha = 0.41 + 0.09 ind 
  (10.76)  (2.78) 
 
0.344*** 
 
-3.56** 
 
tha = 1.03 + 0.43 ind 
  (11.24)  (25.30) 
 
0.134 
 
-3.16*** 
 
tha = 0.69 + 0.35 ind 
  (1.45)  (7.37) 
 
0.052 
 
-1.82 
 
tha = 0.50 + 0.19 ind 
  (2.48)  (5.16) 
 
0.080 
 
-3.62** 
N.A. N.A. N.A. tha = 1.95 + 0.80 mal 
  (18.59)  (13.28) 
0.050 -1.98 tha = 1.12 + 0.98 mal 
  (4.85)  (14.19) 
0.075 -2.24 tha = 1.15 + 0.31 mal 
  (24.60)  (8.54) 
0.108 -4.44* 
tha = -0.17 + 0.39 phi 
  (-2.42)  (9.64) 
0.503** -4.46* tha = -1.37 + 1.39 phi 
  (-6.00)  (19.91) 
0.164 -3.47** tha = 1.91 + 0.45 phi 
  (3.74)  (4.34) 
0.035 -1.42 tha = 0.53 + 0.28 phi 
  (2.54)  (4.77) 
0.067 -3.59** 
tha = 0.08 + 0.81 kor 
  (4.50)  (23.32) 
1.189* -7.61* tha = 0.97 + 0.65 kor 
  (11.22)  (27.56) 
0.153 -3.38** tha = 1.36 + 0.54 kor 
  (6.31)  (14.18) 
0.080 -2.28 tha = -0.01 + 0.89 kor 
  (-0.06)  (12.55) 
0.184 -4.71* 
Note: Based on 100 observations, the critical values are 0.511 (1%), 0.386 (5%), and 0.322 (10%) for the Durbin-Watson test and 4.07 (1%), 3.37 (5%), and 3.03 (10%) for the Dickey-Fuller test. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table A4: Granger-causality inside Asia  
 tranquil period  crisis period  transition period  post-crisis period  
 
 
VAR  
model 
Error Correction Model VAR  
model 
Error Correction Model VAR 
model 
Error Correction Model VAR 
model 
Error Correction Model 
direction of 
causality 
F-test for 
H0: γi=0 
F-test for 
H0: γ i =ϕ=0 
F-test for 
H0: γ i =0 
t-test for 
H0: ϕ=0 
F-test for 
H0: γi=0 
F-test for 
H0: γ i =ϕ=0 
F-test for 
H0: γ i =0 
t-test for 
H0: ϕ=0 
F-test for 
H0: γi=0 
F-test for 
H0: γ i =ϕ=0 
F-test for 
H0: γ i =0 
t-test for 
H0: ϕ=0 
F-test for 
H0: γi=0 
F-test for 
H0: γ i =ϕ=0 
F-test for 
H0: γ i =0 
t-test for 
H0: ϕ=0 
                 
ind Ö kor 1.45 - - - 1.22 - - - 1.32 - - - 0.75 0.77 0.80 -0.77 
kor Ö ind 1.32 - - - 2.70* - - - 2.38* - - - 1.61*** 1.56*** 1.36 -2.54** 
                 
phi Ö kor 0.89 0.94 0.93 -0.56 1.65** 1.80* 1.68** -3.55* 1.53*** - - - 1.45 1.48 1.53*** -0.39 
kor Ö phi 0.93 1.19 1.12 -1.48 3.24* 3.48* 3.33*** -1.79*** 1.32 - - - 1.37 - - - 
                 
mal Ö kor 1.20 - - - 0.65 - - - 2.31* - - - 1.66** 1.49*** 1.56*** -0.05 
kor Ö mal 0.89 - - - 1.43 - - - 0.60 - - - 1.90** - - - 
                 
tha Ö kor 0.44 0.54 0.53 0.83 0.70 0.77 0.48 -3.02* 0.99 - - - 1.08 0.99 1.05 -0.02 
kor Ö tha 1.71** 2.04* 1.56*** 2.86* 1.17 1.23 0.91 -1.88*** 2.14* - - - 0.76 0.73 0.63 -1.99** 
                 
ind Ö tha 0.90 0.80 0.83 -0.28 1.88* - - - 2.45* - - - 1.10 0.81 0.82 -0.91 
tha Ö ind 0.90 - - - 0.45 - - - 0.49 - - - 0.85 - - - 
                 
mal Ö tha 1.10 - - - 2.81* - - - 1.19 - - - 0.68 0.66 0.67 -0.42 
tha Ö mal 0.61 - - - 1.17 - - - 0.41 - - - 1.38 - - - 
                 
phi Ö tha 1.85** 1.77** 1.74** -1.31 4.83* 4.71* 3.80* -2.90* 1.29 - - - 1.26 1.25 1.30 0.07 
tha Ö phi 0.58 0.62 0.58 -1.53 0.25 0.34 0.27 -1.12 0.56 - - - 1.00 - - - 
                 
ind Ö mal 0.44 - - - 3.69* - - - 1.76** - - - 0.70 - - - 
mal Ö ind 0.74 - - - 0.60 - - - 0.40 - - - 1.98** - - - 
                 
ind Ö phi 0.84 - - - 2.26* - - - 0.82 - - - 1.52*** - - - 
phi Ö ind 0.58 - - - 1.04 - - - 5.11* - - - 1.27 - - - 
                 
phi Ö mal 0.99 - - - 3.81* - - - 1.41 - - - 1.54*** - - - 
mal Ö phi 0.83 - - - 0.41 - - - 0.61 - - - 7.56* 7.43* 7.22* -1.88*** 
                 
Note: For periods in which series are found to be I(0), no cointegration analysis can be conducted. This is indicated by “-“. In case of no cointegration, the reported F-test statistics are based on a VAR regression using levels for  I(0) series 
and first differences for I(1) series. In case of cointegration, the reported F-test statistics are based on level VAR regressions. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. “x Ö y” indicates causality from 
x to y. 
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Tranquil Period 19.12.96 - 01.07.97
Indonesia
Korea Philippines
Malaysia
Thailand
Crisis Period 02.07.97 - 31.07.98
Indonesia
Korea Philippines
Malaysia
Thailand
Transition Period 01.08.98 - 31.07.99
Indonesia
Korea Philippines
Malaysia
Thailand
Post Crisis Period 01.08.99 – 16.03.00
Indonesia
Korea Philippines
Malaysia
Thailand
Note:  Solid arrows indicate a short-term causality whereas dotted arrowsindicate long-term causality at a significance level of at least 5%.
Figure 1: Causality within Asia
 
